CONTACT INFORMATION
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Phone:	656-8720
E-Mail:	vandenbergh@bsad.uvm.edu
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Publication History

Journal Article, Academic Journal

• Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Making Friends in Hostile Environments: Political Strategy in Regulated Industries" (Refereed) - Academy of Management Review - 2008 - v. 33, no. 2, pp. 521-540 [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: We examine how regulated firms target their political strategies at multiple government institutions in order to gain more favorable regulatory agency decisions than would otherwise occur. By integrating the corporate political strategy and positive political theory literatures we derive propositions that (a) identify the political and regulatory circumstances that generate hostile environments from the firm's perspective, (b) delineate the conditions under which firms will employ an indirect strategy (i.e. target legislatures or executives) instead of a direct strategy (i.e. target regulators) to induce changes in regulator decisions; and, importantly, (c) we identify the specific political institutions a firm will target when adopting (b). Even though our structured-interaction approach to the analysis of formal institutions is quite straightforward, we are able to develop a rich set of predictions about firms' political strategy that can form the basis for future empirical testing.
  
• Vanden Bergh, R. G.; Holburn, G. - "Targeting Corporate Political Strategy in Pivotal Political Institutions: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Accounting Industry" (Refereed) - Business and Politics - 2007 - v. 9, no. 2, [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: By analyzing the interaction between a business firm and multiple government institutions (including a regulatory agency, an executive and a bicameral legislature), we develop predictions about how firms target their political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more favorable public policies. The core of our argument is that firms will target their resources at the institution that is 'pivotal' in the policy-making process. We develop a simple framework, drawing on the political science literature, which identifies pivotal institutions in different types of political environments. We find empirical support for our thesis in an analysis of how U.S. accounting firms shifted their political campaign contributions between the House and Senate in response to the threat of new regulations governing auditor independence during the 1990s.
  
• Vanden Bergh, R. G.; Holburn, G. L. - "Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States " (Refereed) - Public Choice - 2006 - v. 126, no. 1-2, pp. 45-73 [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: We examine the conditions under which state legislatures in the United States organized public utility consumers during the 1970s and 1980s by creating independent consumer advocates with resources and authority to intervene in public utility rate-making procedures. While economic factors, notably utility fuel cost increases, were important predictors, state political conditions were estimated to have a larger impact on the probability of implementation. We find that the pattern of adoption is consistent with the hypothesis that legislatures deploy institutions as a mechanism for insulating regulatory policies against future reform: in general, Democrat-controlled governments were significantly more likely to implement consumer advocates when they were less certain about being re-elected to office during this period. We find also that the effect of political re-election expectations was particularly acute for the creation of advocates representing solely residential consumers, a relatively disorganized interest group. Our results suggest that legislatures organize and publicly fund interest groups to protect supportive but vulnerable groups against adverse future political environments.
  
• Bonardi, J. P.; Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Non Market Strategy in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities" (Refereed) - Academy of Management Journal - 2006 - v. 49, no. 6, [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of 'political markets' - where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers - we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms' nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the firm's recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from other firms' recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support for our arguments.
  
• Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Political Dynamics and Institutional Reform: The Diffusion of Consumer Advocacy Offices in the United States" (Refereed) - Public Choice - 2006 - v. 126, no. 1-2, pp. 45-73 [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: We examine the conditions under which state legislatures in the United States organized public utility consumers during the 1970s and 1980s by creating independent consumer advocates with resources and authority to intervene in public utility rate-making procedures. While economic factors, notably utility fuel cost increases, were important predictors, state political conditions were estimated to have a larger impact on the probability of implementation. We find that the pattern of adoption is consistent with the hypothesis that legislatures deploy institutions as a mechanism for insulating regulatory policies against future reform: in general, Democrat-controlled governments were significantly more likely to implement consumer advocates when they were less certain about being re-elected to office during this period. We find also that the effect of political re-election expectations was particularly acute for the creation of advocates representing solely residential consumers, a relatively disorganized interest group. Our results suggest that legislatures organize and publicly fund interest groups to protect supportive but vulnerable groups against adverse future political environments.
  
• Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Influencing Agencies through Pivotal Political Institutions" (Refereed) - Journal of Law, Economics & Organization - 2004 - v. 20, no. 2, pp. 458-483 [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: We draw on the positive political theory and campaign finance literatures to examine how interest groups allocate influence activities (e.g. monetary donations, lobbying) across multiple government institutions when seeking more favorable agency policy decisions. By modeling agency behavior in the context of legislative oversight, we derive testable predictions about the political conditions under which an interest group will influence a) only the agency, b) the legislature and/or executive instead of the agency, c) the legislature or executive in addition to the agency, in order to induce a shift in regulatory policy. One implication of our conclusions relating to b) and c) is that empirical studies seeking to identify a relationship between electoral campaign contributions and public policy using data on legislative votes are potentially mis-specified.
  
• De Figueiredo , R. J.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "The Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts" (Refereed) - Journal of Law & Economics - 2004 - v. 47, no. 2, pp. 569-588 [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: One of the most important recent developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the recognition that the organizational procedures enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by only limited empirical investigation. We attempt to address this gap in the literature by examining the conditions under which generic Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) are adopted by the states. In particular, we test five hypotheses derived from the existing literature on when an APA will be adopted. In general, we find two conditions increase the likelihood that an APA will be adopted: first, when there are Democratic legislative supermajorities facing a Republican governor; and second, when there is Democratic control that is perceived to be temporary. These results indicate that existing theories which emphasize agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid, albeit with an important qualification: there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administrative procedures for these purposes.
  
• Spiller, P. T.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Toward a Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making" (Refereed) - Business and Politics - 2003 - v. 5, no. 1, pp. 7-43 [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore in detail from a theoretical perspective how state supreme court decisions are affected by the institutions and institutional rules surrounding their contitutional interpretations, and to empirically test the theoretical implications. We expand upon the neo-institutional and positive political approaches to develop a theoretical framework. This framework predicts that justice selection rules interact with the nature of state politics to constrain judicial behavior. Second, to perform an indirect test of our framework. One implication of our framework is that when the state supreme court justices face a retention reelection rule and the polity's preferences are not closely alighed, then the probability of observing constitutional amendment proposals rises. We empirically investigate this hypothesis utilizing state level data on constitutional amendment proposals and the socio-political institutional environment. The empirical results suport this implication of the theoretical model.
  
• Jackson, A.; Nickerson, A.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Economizing in a Context of Strategizing: Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition" (Refereed) - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - 1999 - v. 40, no. 1, pp. 1-15 [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: This paper builds on Riordan and Williamson's (1985) paper by exploring the economizing choice of organizational form by firms competing in a homogeneous good market. The paper investigates rivalrous firms'; investment and organization choice in a Cournot competition. The model suggests that both governance cost and strategic interactions can influence which asset-organization pair each firm chooses. Application of the model is illustrated with a discussion of the cola wars and the organziation of the fountain channel.
  

Conference Proceeding

• Bonardi, J. P.; Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Non Market Strategy in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities" (Refereed) - Academy of Management - 2006 [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: Best Paper Proceedings - Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of 'political markets' - where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers - we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms' nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the firm's recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from other firms' recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support for our arguments.
  

Book, Chapter in Scholarly Book-New

• Vanden Bergh, R. G.; De Figueriredo, R. J. - "Political Uncertainty in Administrative Procedures" - Uncertainty in American Politics - 2003 - pp. 48-74 , Cambridge Univ. Press [View publication] [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: Combining insights about political feasibility and political incentives in a static delegatory environment, with insights about political uncertainty and the dynamic considerations implied by electoral volatility, we develop a theoretical model to explore the design of administrative procedures (procedures that govern the regulatory process). The formal model captures the interaction between a legislature, an elected executive and a representative executive-branch agency in both a static and dynamic environment. The dynamic portion of the model incorporates the degree of uncertainty about future political environments. We illustrate the most important result in the paper by discussing two cases: the origins of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the emergence of the Federal Communications Commission and broadcast radio regulation.
  
• Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. - "Polciy and Process: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Design of Non-Market Strategy" (Refereed) - Advances in Strategic Management: The New Institutionalism in Strategic Management - 2002 - v. 19, pp. 33-66 , Oxford UK: JAI Press [Show/Hide Abstract]
  Abstract: We draw on the Positive Political Theory literature to develop insights into how firms decide whether to lobby legislatures or agencies in order to gain favorable policy outcomes. We present a simple structural model of the interaction between a firm, a legislature, an executive, a court and an agency to illustrate how, even if the agency has responsibility for implementing public policy, the firm will, under the right conditions, lobby the legislature instead to bring about a change in policy. Accordingly, we contribute to the existing non-market strategy literature by incorporating institutional players other than the legislature into the analysis, and by addressing the question of how firms allocate lobbying resources across the different branches of government.